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Abstract 
A multilateral assignment market with buyers and a number of different types of firms can be modeled by a multi-
sided assignment game. We prove that core allocations of the latter are in a one-to-one correspondence with 
competitive prices of the former, where the notion of competitive price extends that of Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
This result generalizes to multi-sided assignment markets the characterization of competitive prices known for the two-
sided case.
I would like to thank Carles Rafels and Josep Maria Izquierdo for their comments and suggestions. Support from grant Programa FPU of 
Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia of the Spanish Government and from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA, Ministerio de Educacion 
y Ciencia and FEDER, under grant ECO2008-02344/ECON is acknowledged. 
Citation: Oriol Tejada, (2010) ''A note on competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.1 pp. 658-
662. 
Submitted: Nov 12 2009.   Published: March 05, 2010. 
 
     1 Introduction
Consider a market in which there are buyers and two types of ﬁrms producing
respectively two types of indivisible and perfectly complementary goods. Let S =
{S1,...,Sns} and H = {H1,...,Hnh} be the two sets of goods. For instance, S could be
a set of software products and H a set of hardware products. Suppose there are ns ﬁrms
each one of them producing exactly one diﬀerent unit of S at unitary costs cS
1,...,cS
ns
respectively and nh ﬁrms each one of them producing exactly one diﬀerent unit of
H at unitary costs cH
1 ,...,cH
nh respectively. Each buyer is only interested on buying at
most one unit of each type of product, but has no utility on buying separately either
a unit of S or a unit of H. If B = {B1,...,Bnb} is the set of nb buyers, we denote by
wk
ij the willingness-to-pay of buyer Bk for the pair (Si,Hj).
In this market, a transaction can only be carried out when a buyer acquires exactly
a unit of S and a unit of H. Let pi and qj be the prices the buyer Bk pays for Si and
Hj, respectively. At such prices, her utility is given by wk
ij−pi−qj, whereas the beneﬁt
of the ﬁrm producing Si is pi−cS
i and the beneﬁt of the ﬁrm producing Hj is qj−cH
j . If
we assume that the utility of the agents is monetary and transferable the total surplus
generated by a transaction is
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j < 0 no transaction will be carried out because there are no prices








be the ’social surplus’ generated when Si, Hj and Bk
are ’assigned’, i.e: when buyer Bk buys Si and Hj. If we are only interested on how the
social surplus is divided among agents, the above market is completely determined by
giving the sets of buyers and ﬁrms and the set of parameters aijk.
The model can be generalized to an arbitrary m-sided market, with m−1 diﬀerent
types of goods and can be studied in the framework of multi-sided assignment games,
that were introduced by Quint (1991) as the generalization of two-sided assignment
games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).
In the present paper we show that competitive prices of any of such markets are
in one-to-one correspondence with core allocations of an associated cooperative game,
namely a multi-sided assignment game, where the notion of competitive price extends
that of Roth and Sotomayor (1990). In Section 2 we present the necessary notation
and background results concerning multi-sided assignment games, whereas in Section
3 the notion of competitive price is introduced and the main result of the paper is
proved.
2 Multi-sided assignment games
An m-sided assignment problem (m-SAP) denoted by (N1,...,Nm;A), is given by
m ≥ 2 diﬀerent nonempty ﬁnite sets (or types) of agents N1,...,Nm and a nonnegative
m-dimensional matrix A = (aE)E∈
 m
j=1 Nj. With some abuse of notation, let Nk =
{1,2,...,nk} for all k = 1,...,m. We shall refer to the i-th agent of type k as i ∈ Nk. We
name any m-tuple of agents E ∈
 m
k=1Nk an essential coalition. Each entry aE ≥ 0
represents the proﬁt associated to the essential coalition E. As an abuse of notation,
and when no confusion is possible, we shall also use E to denote the set of agents that
form the essential coalition.
A matching µ = {E1,...,Et} among N1,...,Nm is a set of essential coalitions such
that |µ| = t = min1≤j≤m|Nj| and any agent belongs at most to one essential coalition
1E1,...,Et. We say that an agent is unassigned by µ if she does not belong to Ek for any
1 ≤ k ≤ t. We denote by M(N1,...,Nm) the set of all matchings among N1,...,Nm.





for any µ ∈ M(N1,...,Nm). We denote by M∗
A(N1,...,Nm) the set of all optimal
matchings of (N1,...,Nm;A). Since n1,...,nm are ﬁnite, at least one optimal matching
always exists and thus M∗
A(N1,...,Nm) is always nonempty.
Following Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Quint (1991), for each multi-sided as-
signment problem (N1,...,Nm;A) the m-sided assignment game (m-SAG) is the co-
operative game 1 (N,ωA) with set of players N = ∪m
j=1Nj composed of all agents of












for any S ⊆ N, where the summation over the empty set is zero. If m = 2, the
previous setting reduces to the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment game.
The core of a game is the set of allocations that cannot be improved upon by
any coalition on its own 2 . It is easy to check that the core C(ωA) of a given m-SAG




i∈E xi ≥ aE for any E ∈
 m
k=1Nk, where the inequality must be tight if E belongs
to some optimal matching, and xi = 0 for any agent i ∈ N that is unassigned under
some optimal matching.
3 Competitive prices of multilateral markets
An arbitrary assignment market like the one described in the Introduction shall
be denoted by AM(c1,...,cm−1;w), where w ∈ Mnm×k(R+), k = n1   ...   nm−1 is the
matrix of willingness-to-pay of buyers and cj ∈ Rnj is the vector of unitary costs of
ﬁrms of type j, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1.
To any m-sided market AM(c1,...,cm−1;w) we associate a m-SAP (N1,...,Nm;A),
where N1,...,Nm−1 are the sets of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sectors, Nm is the set of buyers








, for all E = (i1,...,im) ∈
 m
j=1Nj.
On the one hand, for each x = ((xi)i∈Nj)
m
j=1, we deﬁne a unique vector of prices




ij = xij + c
j
ij, for all ij ∈ Nj
and 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. We say that {px : x ∈ C(ωA)} is the set of core prices of
AM(c1,...,cm−1;w).
On the other hand, we follow Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and deﬁne the demand
























1 A cooperative game is a pair (N,v), where N is the set of players and v, the characteristic
function, associates a numerical value v(S) ∈ R to any coalition S ⊆ N, being v(∅) = 0.
2 Formally, given (N,v), the core is the set C(v) := {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S)
for all S ⊂ N}, where x(S) :=
 
i∈S xi.
3 Notice that Di(p) may be empty.
2We say that a price vector p is quasi-competitive if pij ≥ c
j
ij, for all ij ∈ Nj and
1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, and there is a matching µ ∈ M(N1,...,Nm) such that, if Dim(p)  = ∅
for some im ∈ Nm, there is (i1,...,im−1,im) ∈ µ satisfying (i1,...,im−1) ∈ Di(p). The
matching µ is said to be compatible with p. The pair (p,µ) is a competitive equilibrium
(and the price p is called competitive) if p is quasi-competitive, µ is compatible with p
and pk = c
j
k for all k ∈ Nj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m−1, such that k is either unassigned or assigned
to a buyer with an empty demand set under µ. We next prove that competitive prices
are core prices, and vice versa.
Theorem 1 Let AM(c1,...,cm−1;w) be an arbitrary m-sided assignment market. Then,
the set of core prices coincides with the set of competitive prices.
Proof. Let (N1,...,Nm;A) be the m-SAP associated to AM(c1,...,cm−1;w). By
adding dummy agents, we can assume without loss of generality that there is the
same number of buyers and ﬁrms of each sector n1 = ... = nm = n, which im-
plies that no agent is unmatched under any matching. First we prove that if p =
((pi)i∈Nj)
m−1
j=1 ∈ Rn(m−1) is a competitive price then it is a core price, that is, p = px





j=1 ∈ Rnm by x
p
ij = pij − c
j







ij∈Nj,1≤j≤m−1pij if Dim(p)  = ∅, where (i1,...,im−1,im) ∈ µ, or
x
p
im = 0 otherwise, for all im ∈ Nm. Since p is competitive, xp ≥ 0. Furthermore, we



















































where the inequality is tight if E′ ∈ µ and Di(p)  = ∅. Hence, xp(N) ≥
 
E′∈µ′ aE′ for
any µ′ ∈ M(N1,...,Nm) and xp(N) ≥ ωA(N), where, as usual, x(S) :=
 
i∈S xi. Lastly,
given E = (i1,...,im) ∈ µ with Dim(p) = ∅, we have that x
p
im = 0 by construction of
xp, and x
p
ij = pij −c
j


























In conclusion, xp ∈ C(ωA) and p is a core price, since we trivially have pxp = p.
Second, we prove that if px = ((px
i)i∈Nj)
m−1




ij + xij for all ij ∈ Nj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, where x ∈ C(ωA), then px is a competitive
price. Let µ be an optimal matching. Without loss of generality suppose that there
is s ∈ {1,...,n} such that, for all E ∈ µ, either aE > 0 if 1 ≤ im ≤ s or aE = 0
otherwise, where E = (i1,...,im). Since x ∈ C(ωA), we have that px
ij − cij ≥ 0, for all
3ij ∈ Nj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1. Next we prove that µ is a compatible matching with px.



















kj − xkm + xkm
≤w
km


























 + xkm ≤ xkm,
where the ﬁrst inequality holds since x ∈ C(ωA) and it is tight if E′ ∈ µ, and






kj ≥ 0. Since 1 ≤ km ≤ s, we have






xkm and, therefore, (i1,...,im−1) ∈ Dkm(p). Finally, if s + 1 ≤ km ≤ n, we have
 




ij for all ij ∈ Nj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m−1 and therefore µ is a compatible matching with
px.
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